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Abstract
Recent corporate scandals and allegations of corporate fraud in public companies have most people asking
how things went so wrong. When looking to assess blame for corporate malfeasance, many ask, “Where were
the lawyers?” In several high-profile corporate fraud investigations, outside and in-house lawyers were
criticized for not doing more to prevent corporate executives from violating the law, and several general
counsels were charged with criminal misconduct by state and federal authorities. Why would the general
counsel of a public corporation risk his or her career, reputation, and criminal prosecution to assist executives
in perpetuating corporate fraud? The answer may be in the purported reason for corporate greed and
ultimately corporate fraud – the desire for equity wealth. This article generally explores the issue of whether
stock options granted to the general counsel increases financial dependence of the general counsel on a single
client, aligns the financial interests of the general counsel too closely with the financial interests of senior
management, and risks the loss of independent judgment and candor by general counsel. Part II of the article
reviews the role of the general counsel in public companies, the growth in salary and stock option
compensation, and introduces discussion of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. Part III examines case law and
administrative decisions, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, and subsequent Securities and Exchange Commission
regulations.
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CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY: ENSURING INDEPENDENT
JUDGMENT OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL-
A LOOK AT STOCK OPTIONS
Z. JILL BARCLIFT*
Former chief corporate counsel [of Tyco] is indicted on grand larceny
in Manhattan. I
SEC files charges against former chief legal officer of Tyco.2
Former chief counsel of Rite Aid convicted. 3
WorldCom general counsel resigns amid allegations of fraud.4
I. INTRODUCTION
Recent corporate scandals and allegations of corporate fraud in public
companies have most people asking how things went so wrong. 5 Many
*Z. Jill Barclift, Visiting Assistant Professor Hamline University School of Law. A graduate
of Columbia University School of Law in 1983, Professor Barclift began her career as an attorney
with a large, mid-west financial services company. Before teaching at Hamline University School
of Law, she was executive vice president, secretary, and general counsel of a financial services
company in Minneapolis. Her practice and scholarship areas include corporate law, governance,
and business ethics. Acknowledgments: Thank you to the faculty and staff of Hamline University
School of Law for your support and encouragement. Special thanks to Professor Carol Swanson
and my research assistants: Richie Reyes, Tracey Coates, and Dawn O'Rourke.
1. Greg Levine, Merck's Anstice Won't Budge; Tyco Ex-Lawyer Belnick: I'm Innocent, Feb.
4, 2003, http:// www.forbes.com/2003/02/04/0204facesamprint.html; Kara Scannell & Laurie P.
Cohen, Leading the News: Charges Against Tyco Ex-Counsel Expand to Include Grand Larceny,
WALL ST. J., Feb. 4, 2003, at A3; Cable News Network, Ex-Tyco Counsel to Stand Trial, Aug. 13,
2003, http://cnnmoney.printthis.clickability.com/pt/cptaction=cpt&expire=&urllD=7196587
&fb... ; The Blue Sage Group, Tyco Scandal, http://www.thebluesagegroup.com/
scandal_tyco.htm (last visited July 20, 2005).
2. Press Release, United States Securities and Exchange Commission, Litigation Release No.
17722 (Sept. 12, 2002) (on file with author); Cable News Network, Three Tyco Execs Indicted for
Fraud, Sept. 12, 2002, http://cnn.worldnews.printthis.clickability.com/pt/cptaction=cpt&expire=-
1&urllD=4688
3. Executives on Trial: Rite Aid Ex-Counsel is Convicted, WALL ST. J., Oct. 20, 2003, at C8.
4. Caron Carlson, WorldCom Woes Hit Users, June 16, 2003 (on file with author),
http://www.eweek.com/article2/0,1759,1128529,00.asp.
5. See Alexei Barrionuevo & Jonathan Weil, Partner Warned Arthur Andersen on Enron
Audit, WALL ST. J., May 9, 2002, at C1 (chronicling internal communications regarding Arthur
Anderson's audits for Enron).
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blame corporate corruption on the lack of board leadership. 6 Others blame
corporate financial fraud on accounting firms and other corporate
gatekeepers' failure to do their jobs.7 Most Americans blame such cor-
porate debacles on executive greed.8 Still others consider the growth in
executive compensation and stock option grants as catalysts for corporate
greed. 9 Pressure on corporate executives to keep the stock price up for
short-term goals and to maximize equity wealth for personal gain have
created corporate environments where financial mismanagement is tol-
erated, if not encouraged.l0
When looking to assess blame for corporate malfeasance, many ask,
"Where were the lawyers?"11 In several high-profile corporate fraud
investigations, outside and in-house lawyers were criticized for not doing
more to prevent corporate executives from violating the law, and several
general counsels were charged with criminal misconduct by state and
federal authorities.12 Why would the general counsel of a public corpo-
ration risk his or her career, reputation, and criminal prosecution to assist
6. See Tom Becker, Delaware Justice Warns Boards of Liability for Executive Pay, WALL
ST. J., Jan. 6, 2003, at A14 (reporting comments made by the chief justice of the Delaware
Supreme Court on the legal liability of corporate directors); Carol Hymowitz, Corporate
Governance: How to Fix a Broken System, WALL ST. J., Feb. 24, 2003, at RI (suggesting ways to
change the composition and standards of corporate boards); Berkshire Hathaway, Inc., 1998
ANNUAL REPORT 13-15 (Mar. 1, 1999), available at http://www.berkshirehathaway.com/
1998ar/impnote98.html (describing changes to the corporation's stock option plan in response to
recent national corporate scandals).
7. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding Enron: "It's About the Gatekeepers, Stupid," 57
Bus. LAW. 1403, 1409 (2002) (examining the failure of corporate watchdogs, auditors, analysts,
and debt rating agencies to detect Enron's collapse).
8. John Cassidy, The Greed Cycle: How the Financial System Encouraged Corporations to
go Crazy, THE NEW YORKER, Sept. 23, 2003, at 1.
9. Id. at 3-4.
10. Id. at 6-7.
11. David J. Beck, The Legal Profession at the Crossroads: Who Will Write the Future Rules
Governing the Conduct of Lawyers Representing Public Corporations?, 34 St. MARY'S L.J. 873,
874 (2003); Susan D. Carle, The Evolving Legal and Ethical Role of the Corporate Attorney After
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002: Panel Three: Ethical Dilemmas Associated with the Corporate
Attorney's New Role, 52 AM. U. L. REV. 655, 661 (2003); Jenny B. Davis, The Enron Factor:
Experts Say the Energy Giant's Collapse Could Trigger Changes in the Law That Make it Easier
to Snare Professionals, 88 A.B.A. J. 40, 45, 61 (Apr. 2002); Neil Hamilton, Commentary,
Counseling on Business Ethics After Enron and WorldCom, MINN. LAWYER, Aug. 12, 2002 at 1;
Mike France, What About Enron's Lawyers? (Dec. 23, 2002) (on file with author),
http://www.chesslaw.com/buprof.htm. See also Perry Wallace, Jr., The Evolving Legal and
Ethical Role of the Corporate Attorney After the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002: Panel 1: The
Collapse of the Corporate Model, 52 AM. U. L. REV. 579, 580 (2003) (asking generally "What
went wrong?" in terms of the corporate scandals of the time and also what led to those scandals).
12. Christina R. Salem, Note, The New Mandate of the Corporate Lawyer After the Fall of
Enron and the Enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 8 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 765, 766-67
(2003); Chief Justice E. Norman Veasey, The Ethical and Professional Responsibilities of the
Lawyer for the Corporation in Responding to Fraudulent Conduct by Corporate Officers or
Agents, 70 TENN. L. REV. 1, 2 (2002).
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executives in perpetuating corporate fraud? While there is no simple or
single explanation, an answer may be in the purported reason for corporate
greed and ultimately corporate fraud-the desire for equity wealth. The
recent indictments of general counsels at some major corporations suggest
that some corporate attorneys not only may have failed to meet their legal
obligations, but they also may have failed to meet their professional
responsibilities to protect the interests of the corporation, and have
succumbed to corporate cultures of avarice. 13
Independent judgment is a hallmark of lawyer integrity,14 and cor-
porate lawyers bear some of the responsibility for corporate wrongdoing. 15
Public company failures resulting from financial fraud and disclosure
misrepresentation raise questions of whether the general counsel's inde-
pendent judgment is too highly influenced by loyalty to superiors. 16 The
chief legal officer ("CLO") or general counsel 17 of a public company is not
only uniquely positioned to advise his or her client on any legal pitfalls of a
business transaction, but also on what ethical issues are raised in business
decisions.18 Investor confidence in corporate public disclosures and trust in
the corporate governance systems of public companies' boards are
dependent on the integrity of all its gatekeepers. 19
This article generally explores the issues of whether stock options
granted to the general counsel increases the financial dependence of the
13. Roger C. Cramton, Enron and the Corporate Lawyer: A Primer on Legal and Ethical
Issues, 58 BUS. LAW. 143, 144-45 (2002); Mary C. Daly, The Cultural, Ethical and Legal
Challenges in Lawyering for a Global Organization: The Role of the General Counsel, 46 EMORY
L.J. 1057, 1061-63 (1997).
14. See generally A.B.A. CENTER FOR PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY, MODEL RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT PREAMBLE & SCOPE, at 1-2 (2003); Susanna M. Kim, Dual Identities and Dueling
Obligations: Preserving Independence in Corporate Representation, 68 TENN. L. REV. 179, 188
(2001) (presenting the ideal that lawyer independence is "non-negotiable" because it is a duty
owed to the legal profession).
15. Kim, supra note 14, at 207; Susan P. Koniak, Regulating the Lawyer: Past Efforts and
Future Possibilities: When the Hurlyburly's Done: The Bar's Struggle with the SEC, 103 COLUM.
L. REV. 1236, 1237-38, 1240, 1245 (2003).
16. Kim, supra note 14, at 184; Irma S. Russell, Keeping the Wheels on the Wagon:
Observations on Issues of Legal Ethics for Lawyers Representing Business Organizations, 3 WYO.
L. REV. 513, 517-18 (2003). See also MIMI SWARTZ WITH SHERRON WATKINS, POWER FAILURE:
THE INSIDE STORY OF THE COLLAPSE OF ENRON 228, 251-52, 302, 309, 326 (Doubleday, 2003)
(chronicling participation and loyalties of Enron's general counsel).
17. This article uses the terms chief legal officer and general counsel interchangeably. Both
terms are used to define the head legal counsel employed by a public corporation.
18. John C. Coffee, Jr., The Attorney as Gatekeeper: An Agenda for the SEC, 103 COLUM. L.
REV. 1293, 1296, 1298 (2003); Russell, supra note 16, at 514; Richard W. Painter, The Moral
Interdependence of Corporate Lawyers and Their Clients, 67 S. CAL. L. REV. 507, 513-514
(1994).
19. See Coffee, supra note 7, at 1405; Thomas H. Watkins, Ethics: Are Lawyers the Last
Line of Defense for Critical Accounting, Corporate Governance and Auditing Issues Under
Sarbanes-Oxley?, 735 PLI/PAT 531, 555-56, 564-65 (2002).
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general counsel on a single client, aligns the financial interests of the
general counsel too closely with the financial interests of senior
management, and risks the loss of independent judgment and candor by the
general counsel.
More specifically, Part II of the article reviews the role of the general
counsel in public companies, the growth in salary and stock option
compensation for the general counsel, the use of stock options in executive
compensation, and introduces a discussion of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and
recommends changes to the Model Rules of Professional Conduct for
attorneys. Part III more closely reviews the American Bar Association
("ABA") Model Rules of Professional Conduct and specifically analyzes
Model Rule 1.7 on Conflict of Interests and its application to the general
counsel for maintaining independent judgment. This part argues that Model
Rule 1.7 fails to address the realities of the job of general counsel and that
Rule 1.7 offers little practical guidance on how to handle conflicts of
interest. Part III then examines recent amendments, case law and
administrative decisions, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, and subsequent
Securities and Exchange Commission regulations applicable to attorneys
for guidance on what is required for general counsels to maintain
independent judgment on behalf of corporate clients. This part also asserts
that Sarbanes-Oxley now mandates that general counsels serve as the legal
gatekeepers to public companies, resulting in a greater need for general
counsels to give independent advice to clients.
Finally, Part IV of this article concludes that, in addition to the
recommendations of the American Bar Association Corporate Governance
Resolution, 20 to ensure independent judgment of the general counsel,
Boards of public corporations should (1) determine the compensation,
including bonus, of the general counsel; (2) compensate and reward the
general counsel for managing the legal affairs of the company and not for
reaching financial performance goals; and, (3) eliminate stock options from
total compensation.
20. ABA TASK FORCE ON CORP. RESPONSIBILITY, FINAL REPORT OF THE AMERICAN BAR
ASSOCIATION TASK FORCE ON CORP. RESPONSIBILITY (Mar. 31, 2003) [hereinafter Final
Report], available at http://www.abanet.org/buslaw/corporateresponsibility/final-report.pdf.
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II. THE ROLE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL AND
COMPENSATION
A. THE GENERAL COUNSEL'S JOB
As in-house legal departments have grown, so have the duties of the
general counsel. 21 The job of the general counsel is to serve as advisor to
senior management and the board of directors. 22 He or she is also CLO and
department head for the corporate legal department, transactional attorney
responsible for completion of business deals, and as legal gatekeeper for the
corporation's public constituencies, serves as the corporate secretary. 23
1. Executive Officer and Department Head
The general counsel or CLO is legal advisor to the executive officers, a
key member of executive management, and in most companies, reports
directly to the chief executive officer.24 Many general counsels also hold
the title of executive vice president.2 5 The general counsel usually has a
close relationship with the chief executive officer and other members of
senior management, particularly the chief financial officer. 26
21. See Carl D. Liggio, The Role of the General Counsel: Perspective: The Changing Role of
Corporate Counsel, 46 EMORY L.J. 1201, 1201-03 (1997) (chronicling the changing position of
corporate counsel); Milton C. Regan, Jr., Professional Responsibility and the Corporate Lawyer,
13 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 197 (2000) (discussing the growing complexity of corporations and the
subsequent demands on the general counsel); Sally R. Weaver, The Role of the General Counsel:
Perspective: Ethical Dilemmas of Corporate Counsel: A Structural and Contextual Analysis, 46
EMORY L.J. 1023, 1027 (1997) (listing possible non-legal positions that corporate counsel may
simultaneously hold).
22. See generally J. RANDOLPH AYRE, CORPORATE LEGAL DEPARTMENTS: STRATEGIES
FOR THE 1990'S (2d ed., 1990) (providing insight into managing corporate legal departments);
Randolph C. Park, Ethical Challenges: The Dual Role of Attorney-Employee as Inside Corporate
Counsel, 22 HAMLINE L. REV. 783, 790 (1999) (explaining difficulties faced by general counsels
because of this or her position as employee of and attorney to the corporation).
23. See generally Ayre, supra note 22, at 59-65 (describing the organization of a corporate
legal staff); AM. CORP. COUNSEL ASS'N, SURVEY OF CEO'S: IN-HOUSE COUNSEL FOR THE 21ST
CENTURY 1, 2 (May 2001) [hereinafter In-House Counsel Survey] available at
http://www.acca.comSurveys/CEO/CEOReport.pdf (surveying CEO's expectations of in-house
counsel); AM. SOCIETY OF CORP. SECRETARIES, RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE CORP. SECRETARY'S
OFFICE, 1, 8 (2001), available at http://www.ascs.org/toc28.shtml (listing the responsibilities and
personal attributes of the successful corporate secretary).
24. In-House Counsel Survey, supra note 23, at 3; Liggio, supra note 21, at 1208.
25. Weaver, supra note 21, at 1027, 1035; In-House Counsel Survey, supra note 23, at .
26. See generally Weaver, supra note 21, at 1028 (discussing the various evolving
challenged and ethical obligations of the corporate counsel); Liggio, supra note 21, at 1208-09,
1211 (stating that the close relationship between the corporate counsel and his or her client can
create misunderstandings as to the counsel's role and scope of representation).
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The general counsel must also understand the company's business,
counsel management, and assess legal risks.27 Many general counsels also
serve on executive management, strategic planning, and business
development committees, and some general counsels manage business
units. 28 Company management and the board of directors view the general
counsel as part of corporate leadership.29
The corporate legal department is staffed with lawyers practicing in a
variety of specialty areas, and general counsels rely less on outside counsel
to handle many legal matters.3 0 Companies such as General Electric Co.,
Citigroup Inc., State Farm Insurance Co., International Business Machines
Corp., and General Motors Corp., each have more than one hundred in-
house lawyers.3 1 The hierarchy of large corporate law departments (over
twenty-five attorneys) typically consists of the CLO/general counsel,
assistant or deputy chief legal officer, division or group counsel, managing
attorney, senior attorney, and attorneys or staff attorneys. 32 Corporate legal
departments work on matters such as litigation, employment, environ-
mental, real estate, intellectual property, mergers and acquisitions,
commercial, and general corporate issues. 33 The general counsel and his or
her staff practice preventive law and are proactive in assisting clients with
assessment of legal risks and in making decisions on how to handle legal
risks.34
2. Transactional Attorney
The general counsel is often a transactional attorney working with his
or her staff and outside counsel to meet corporate clients' business goals.3 5
As the lead corporate attorney, the general counsel assists clients in
completing business transactions to avoid or minimize legal risks.36 He or
27. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT 2.1 (2003); Liggio, supra note 21, at 1208-09.
28. Liggio, supra note 21, at 1209-10.
29. Weaver, supra note 21, at 1027; Liggio supra note 21, at 1211-13.
30. Liggio, supra note 21, at 1205-06; Susan Hacket, The Future Structure and Regulation of
Law Practice: Inside Out: An Examination of Demographic Trends of the In-House Profession, 44
ARIZ. L. REV. 609, 611-12 (2002).
31. Kilpatrick & Lockhart LLP 10 h Annual Survey, The 200 Largest Legal Departments, 13
CORP. LEGAL TIMES 1, 38 (June 2003) [hereinafter 10th Annual Survey], available at
http://www.cltmag.com/ editorial/surveys/03-Jun.pdf.
32. Ayre, supra note 22, at 19-20.
33. See Liggio, supra note 21, at 1206-07 (outlining the shift in matters handled by corporate
legal departments, specifically mentioning litigation as handled increasingly by in-house counsel).
34. Id. at 1210
35. Id. at 1206. See also In-House Counsel Survey, supra note 23, at 1 (describing survey
results indicating that in-house corporate counsel "understands the business" better than an outside
lawyer).
36. Liggio, supra note 21, at 1208.
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she negotiates and structures the business and legal framework for large
corporate deals.3 7 The general counsel reviews SEC disclosure require-
ments and verifies corporate compliance with various regulations applicable
to the corporation. 38 Senior management looks to the general counsel not
only to complete the transactions, but also to "find a way" notwithstanding
legal challenges. 39
3. Gatekeeper
Though the term gatekeeper is generally ascribed to external auditors,
the general counsel is viewed as an internal corporate gatekeeper for legal
compliance.a0 The general counsel advises the board of directors and senior
management on the legal risks of and compliance with securities laws.41 He
or she conducts internal investigations into allegations of corporate fraud or
violations of law by corporate agents, and reports findings to executive
management.42
4. Corporate Secretary
In many corporations, in addition to managing the legal affairs of the
corporation, the general counsel is the corporate secretary and is responsible
for corporate governance.43 As corporate secretary, the general counsel
maintains corporate records, obtains board approval for certain corporate
actions and plans, distributes documents for board meetings, and takes the
minutes of board and committee meetings.44 The general counsel must be
knowledgeable about securities laws, reporting requirements for executive
officers, and corporate governance requirements of applicable listing
agencies. 45
37. Watkins, supra note 19, at 545-46.
38. Liggio, supra note 21, at 1205-06.
39. Id. at 1209; Weaver, supra note 21, at 1027.
40. Beck, supra note 11, at 882; Coffee, supra note 19, at 1405.
41. Liggio, supra note 21, at 1205-06.
42. Final Report, supra note 20, at 20.
43. See Kilpatrick & Lockhart LLP 8th Annual Survey, The 200 Largest U.S. Law
Departments, CORP. LEGAL TiMES (Aug. 2001) [hereinafter 8th Annual Survey], available at
http://www.cltmag.com/editorial/surveys/01 -Aug.pdf.
44. Id.
45. Huron Consulting Group LLC: 14th Annual Survey of General Counsel, CORP. LEGAL
TIMES (July 2003) [hereinafter 14th Annual Survey], available at http://www.cltmag.com/
editorial/surveys/03-Jul.pdf.
20051
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B. GENERAL COUNSEL'S COMPENSATION
1. Salary and Bonuses
The chief executive officer handles general counsels' salaries and
performance evaluations. 46 Compensation for the CLO of public com-
panies has steadily increased over the years. 47 Compensation packages for
general counsels, including base salaries, bonuses, and equity compensation
are competitive.48 For 2002, survey data indicates salaries for the one
hundred highest paid general counsels ranged from $293,808 to
$1,350,000.49 Total cash compensation for them ranged from $371,667 to
$3,930,000.50
2. Stock Options
Stock options have become an important way for corporate boards to
compensate senior management. 5' A stock option is the right to purchase
shares of a stock in the future at a fixed price. 52 Stock options are one form
of equity compensation and are favored by corporate boards primarily for
corporate tax treatment. 53 However, stock options are granted as incentive
for management performance, alignment of management interests with
those of shareholders, and retention of skilled executives.5 4 One goal of
stock option grants is to align the interests of executive management with
46. l0th Annual Survey, supra note 31; Hackett, supra note 30, at 612.
47. Weaver, supra note 21 ,at 1031; Liggio, supra note 21, at 1207.
48. GC Compensation Survey, CORP. COUNSEL (Aug. 2003) [hereinafter GC Compensation],
available at http://www.law.com/special/professionals/corp-counsel/2003/gc-compensation-
survey.shtml; James Wilber, Expert Advice: And the Survey Says.. ., CORP. COUNSEL (Aug. 1,
2003) http://www.law.com/jsp/cc/pubarticleCC.jsp?id=1056139947559; Rosemary Clancy,
Methodology: Behind the Curtain, CORP. COUNSEL (Aug. 1, 2003) http://www.law.com/
jsp/cc/pubarticleCC.jsp?id= 1056139941726.
49. 14th Annual Survey, supra note 45; GC Compensation, supra note 48; 2002 LAW
DEPARTMENT COMPENSATION BENCHMARKING SURVEY PARTICIPANT'S EXECUTIVE SUMMARY:
SALARY, ALTMAN WEIL, INC. 15 (Oct. 2002) available at http://www.altmanweil.com/
pdf/2003/LDCBEXEC-SUMMARY.pdf.
50. 14th Annual Survey, supra note 45.
51. See Brian J. Hall, What You Need to Know About Stock Options, HARv. BUS. REV.,
Mar.-Apr. 2000, at 93 (explaining that stock options, in terms of total executive compensation,
were at that time greater in value than salaries); see generally STEVEN BALSAM, AN
INTRODUCTION TO EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION (Academic Press 2002).
52. Balsam, supra note 51, at 131-32.
53. Eric L. Johnson, Note: Waste Not, Want Not: An Analysis of Stock Option Plans,
Executive Compensation, and the Proper Standard of Waste, 26 J. CORP. L. 145, 147-48 (2000).
54. Balsam, supra note 51, at 139-40.
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those of shareholders. 55 The result of management and shareholder goal
alignment is that executives work as a team with common goals for the
profitability of the company.56
During the 1990s, large stock option grants created enormous wealth
among executives. 57 Executives profited from the exercise of stock options
often when the financial status of the company was in jeopardy. 58 General
counsels also attained personal wealth from stock options comparable to
that of senior executives within the company. 59
Equity compensation, particularly stock option grants, has become part
of the overall compensation package of general counsels. 60 From 2002 to
2003, stock option grants ranged from $803,134 to $1,780,800 and
exercisable stock option values ranged from $2,328,924 to $13,884,923 for
the top one hundred general counsels. 61 Though current market conditions
55. Rajesh Aggarwal, Executive Compensation and Corporate Controversy, 27 VT. L. REV.
849, 850 (2003); Joann S. Lublin, Executive Pay: Why the Get-Rich-Quick Days May Be Over,
WALL ST. J., April 14, 2003, at R1.
56. Balsam, supra note 51, at 140-41, 289.
57. See Eriq Gardner, Bottoms Up, CORP. COUNSEL (Aug. 1, 2003), http://www.law.com/
jsp/cc/pubarticleCC.jsp?id=1058416383413 (discussing the increase in general counsels' salaries
in the last decade); Wilber, supra note 48 (discussing the rise in general counsels' salaries as
compared to rank and file corporate legal department attorneys); Clancy, supra note 48
(mentioning which general counsels have stayed on the most-compensated list and which have
not); Spotlight on the Winners' Circle, CORP. COUNSEL (July 1, 2004),
http://www.corpcounsel.com/other/3rd-party/GCProfiles.shtml (listing large stock options granted
to various general counsels); GC Compensation, supra note 48 (listing the actual salaries of the
top one hundred corporate general counsels); Press Release, Altman Weil, Inc., Corporate Belt-
Tightening Reflected in Law Department Comp, New Survey Reports (Nov. 11, 2003), available at
http://www.altmanweil.com/news/release.cfm?PRID=36 (on file with author) (comparing general
counsel compensation with the same data from the previous year).
58. See Weathering the Storm, CORP. COUNSEL (July 19, 2002), available at
http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1024079009963 (stating that beginning in 2001, many
general counsels "cashed in on" their stock options); Michael C. Doff, Conflicts of Interest Aren't
All Bad: Lessons From the Corporate Accounting Scandals and Beyond, FINDLAW (July 24,
2002), http://writ.corporate.findlaw.com/dorf/20020724.html (stating that many corporate
managers cashed out their stock before the accounting falsities their companies were engaged in
came to light); Ashby Jones, Stock Options: Staying Afloat, CORP. COUNSEL (Aug. 1, 2003),
available at http://www.law.com/jsp/cc/pubarticleCC.jsp?id=1056139947190 (explaining that
not many general counsels continued to cash out their stock options because of the "miserable"
stock market); Steven Andersen, Reality Check, CORP. LEGAL TIMES (Mar. 2002), available at
http://www.cltmag.com/editorial/surves/march02.cfm (explaining that stock options as
compensation "went out of style in 2001," which was the beginning of many recent corporate
scandals); Dan Lee, Insiders: EBay Counsel Gains $1.4 Million in Sale (March 3, 2003),
available at http://www.siliconvalley.com/mld/siliconvalley/business/columnists/jmsv/
5304458.htm (discussing how senior executives at EBay profited more than $198 million from
cashing out stock options beginning in March 2002).
59. See GC Compensation, supra note 48 (listing the salaries and total compensation for the
top one hundred general counsels in 2002 and 2003).
60. Id.
61. Id.
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have devalued some stock options,62 through 1999 highly compensated
general counsels received more than $50 million by exercising stock
options.63 For example, in 2002, the general counsel of a public commu-
nications company took home nearly $6 million in stock option grants, 64
and a general counsel of a beverage distributor received $9 million in stock
options.65
C. CORPORATE MALFEASANCE AND ATTORNEY MISCONDUCT
Following the corporate fraud scandals involving Enron, Worldcom
and others, Congress passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.66 Sarbanes-Oxley
was designed to implement reforms in accounting and promote further
transparency in corporate disclosures. 67 Corporate misconduct was blamed
on the failure of outside auditors and on market analysts' focus on short-
term financial goals.68 Further, corporate executives were accused of
focusing on short-term financial performance to increase personal financial
gain, rather than on the long-term interests of the shareholders. Stock
options were viewed as contributing to a short-term focus and fostering
corporate cultures of greed.69
In March 2002, the ABA appointed the Cheek Task Force ("CTF") in
an effort to devise rules to address the public perception that lawyers failed
to meet professional responsibility obligations to corporate clients arising
out of the Enron scandal. 70 CTF examined the "systemic issues related to
corporate responsibility." 7 1 This included examining the roles of lawyers,
executives, and others in the context of "checks and balances" for
62. See Jones, supra note 58 (discussing the decreasing favor of stock options as part of
general counsel compensation).
63. Id.
64. Eric Gardner, William Barr: Verizon Communications, Inc., CORP. COUNSEL (Aug. 1,
2003), available at http://www.corpcounsel.com/other/3rd-party/GCProfiles.shtml.
65. Jones, supra note 58.
66. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.); See Corporate Responsibility,
http://www.whitehouse.gov/infocus/corporateresponsibility (last visited July 21, 2005) (outlining
generally the Bush Administration's response to recent corporate scandals, including signing the
Sarbanes Oxley Act into law).
67. Id.
68. Coffee, supra note 7, at 1408.
69. See FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS, COMMISSION ON PUBLIC TRUST AND PRIVATE
ENTERPRISE, ISBN No. 0-8237-0788-1, at 5-6 (2003), available at http://www.conference-
board.org/pdf-free/758.pdf (criticizing the executive use of stock options as compensation).
70. See ABA TASK FORCE ON CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY, PRELIMINARY REPORT OF THE
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION TASK FORCE ON CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY [hereinafter
Preliminary Report] (July 16, 2002), 58 BUS. LAW. 189, 189 (Nov. 2002) (describing the mission
and purpose of the task force).
71. Id. at 191 (quoting Robert Hirshon, President of the American Bar Association).
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maintaining corporate integrity in public companies. 72 CTF issued its
Preliminary Report in July 2002, and its Final Report in March 2003. Both
reports proposed amendments to the Model Rules of Professional Conduct
Rule 1.6 (Confidentiality of Information), Rule 1.13 (Organization as
Client), and recommended the addition of a Corporate Governance
Resolution. 73 CTF did not recommend amendments to Model Rule 1.7
(Conflict of Interests: Current Clients).74 However, in its Preliminary
Report, CTF recommended further review of the impact of stock ownership
in client companies on attorney independent judgment and conflicts of
interest.75
In August 2003, the ABA House of Delegates voted to accept the
changes to the Model Rules recommended by the Cheek Task Force. 76
Though the proposed amendments to the Model Rules provided improved
guidance on revealing client confidences and the organization as client,77
the current Model Rules provide less clarity on the application of Model
Rule 1.7(b) (Conflicts of Interest: Current Clients) to the general counsel's
obligation of independent legal advice.78
III. ATTORNEY INDEPENDENT JUDGMENT-WHAT IS REQUIRED?
A. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
With the majority of states adopting professional responsibility rules
consistent with the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct, 79 a review
of model rules applicable to attorneys representing the organization as client
and conflicts of interest sets the groundwork for understanding the general
counsel's obligation of independent judgment to corporate clients.
72. Id. at 189.
73. Final Report, supra note 20, at 31; Preliminary Report, supra note 70, at 203-06, 209.
74. Final Report, supra note 20, at 31; Preliminary Report, supra note 70, at 212-13.
75. Final Report, supra note 20, at 31; Preliminary Report, supra note 70, at 212-13.
76. See Press Release, American Bar Association, ABA Corporate Responsibility Task Force
Urges New Corporate Governance Policies and Lawyer Ethics Rules: Addresses Practices and
Attitudes that Contributed to Failures (April 29, 2003), available at
http://www.abanet.org/media/apr03/ 042903.html (summarizing the design and purpose of the
recommendations in the task force's final report).
77. Final Report, supra note 20, at 41-47; Preliminary Report, supra note 70, at 203-04.
78. Final Report, supra note 20, at 41-47; Preliminary Report, supra note 70, at 203-04.
79. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT, Preface, at vii (2004); Larry P. Scriggins, Legal
Ethics, Confidentiality, and the Organizational Client, 58 BUs. LAW. 123, 128 (2002).
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1. Who is the Client? Model Rule 1.13 (Organization as
Client) -a Look at the Old and New
Model Rule 1.13 (Organization as Client) focuses on the lawyers
employed by corporate entities. 80 Before its amendment by the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act, Model Rule 1.13 provided that the general counsel is to act in
the best interest of the corporate entity.81 In such corporate representation,
the general counsel was required to accept the decisions of the authorized
corporate agents unless the general counsel knows that the corporate actions
may violate the law. 82 When faced with possible violations of law by the
client, the general counsel was to seek higher review of the matter within
the corporate ranks, and if appropriate, inform the board of directors. 83 If
the general counsel was unable to prevent the client from violating the law
and there is likely substantial injury to the corporation, the general counsel
could have resigned if the client refused to act on the lawyer's advice. 84
Acknowledging that the previous rule provided very little guidance and
mandated no specific action by attorneys, the ABA approved amendments
to Model Rule 1.13 to give greater clarity and guidance to corporate
attorneys. 85 Model Rule 1.13 has been amended to require a corporate
lawyer (in-house and outside counsel) to report certain violations of the law
by officers or employees to higher organizational authority unless the
lawyer believes that disclosure would not be in the best interest of the
organization. 86
80. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.13 (2004). See generally MODEL CODE OF
PROF'L CONDUCT, Canon 5, EC 5-13 (2004); RESTATEMENT OF LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS §
131 (1998).
81. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.13 (1983).
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Final Report, supra note 20, at 41.
86. MODEL RULE OF PROWL CONDUCT R. 1.13 (2004) (emphasis added). Model Rule 1.13
now reads (new language is underlined):
(a) A lawyer employed or retained by an organization represents the organization
acting through its duly authorized constituents.
(b) If a lawyer for an organization knows that an officer, employee or other person
associated with the organization is engaged in action, intends to act or refuses to act in
a matter related to the representation that is a violation of a legal obligation to the
organization, or a violation of law that reasonably might be imputed to the
organization, and that is likely to result in substantial injury to the organization, then
the lawyer shall proceed as is reasonably necessary in the best interest of the
organization. Unless the lawyer reasonably believes that it is not necessary in the best
interest of the organization to do so, the lawyer shall refer the matter to higher
authority in the organization, including. if warranted by the circumstances, to the
highest authority that can act on behalf of the organization as determined by applicable
law.
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2. Comparing the Old and New
The old Model Rule 1.13 did not require the lawyer report a problem
"up the ladder," but instead identified several steps the lawyer "may" take.87
The Cheek Task Force concluded the old Model Rule gave the lawyer
discretion to decide when to take action or do nothing at all, and that the old
Rule 1.13 was confusing. 88 The amended Model Rule 1.13 now requires
the lawyer, if he or she reasonably believes it is in the best interest of the
organization, to report matters to the highest authority in the corporation
who can act on its behalf.89 If the lawyer believes he or she is discharged or
withdraws as a result of reporting the alleged violation of the law, he or she
must proceed, in his or her best judgment, to inform the corporation's
highest authority of his or her discharge or withdrawal. 90
(c) Except as provided in paragraph (d), if
(1) despite the lawyer's efforts in accordance with paragraph (b) the highest
authority that can act on behalf of the organization insists upon or fails to
address in a timely and appropriate manner an action or a refusal to act, that is
clearly a violation of law, and
(2) the lawyer reasonably believes that the violation is reasonably certain to
result in substantial injury to the organization, then the lawyer may reveal
information relating to the representation whether or not Rule 1.6 permits such
disclosure, but only if and to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary
to prevent substantial injury to the organization.
(d) Paragraph (c) shall not apply with respect to information relating to a lawyer's
representation of an organization to investigate an alleged violation of law, or to
defend the organization or an officer, employee or other constituent associated with
the organization against a claim arising out of an alleged violation of law.
(e) A lawyer who reasonably believes that he or she has been discharged because of
the lawyer's actions taken pursuant to paragraphs (b) or (c), or who withdraws under
circumstances that require or permit the lawyer to take action under either of those
paragraphs, shall proceed as the lawyer reasonably believes necessary to assure that
the organization's highest authority is informed of the lawyer's discharge or
withdrawal.
(f) In dealing with an organization's directors, officers, employees, members,
shareholders or other constituents, a lawyer shall explain the identity of the client
when the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that the organization's interests are
adverse to those of the constituents with whom the lawyer is dealing.
(g) A lawyer representing an organization may also represent any of its directors,
officers, employees, members, shareholders or other constituents, subject to the
provisions of Rule 1.7. If the organization's consent to the dual representation is
required by Rule 1.7, the consent shall be given by an appropriate official of the
organization other than the individual who is to be represented, or by the shareholders.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
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B. THE OBLIGATION OF INDEPENDENT JUDGMENT- MODEL RULE
1.7: CONFLICTS OF INTEREST: CURRENT CLIENTS
Model Rule 1.7 requires that a lawyer not represent a client if there is a
significant risk of a conflict of interest, such that the personal interest of the
lawyer has an adverse effect on the client.91 A lawyer is permitted to
represent a client if, notwithstanding the conflict of interest, the lawyer
reasonably believes he or she will be able to provide competent repre-
sentation and the client consents.92 Allowing attorneys to have equity
interests in clients grew out of the contingent fee arrangement in
litigation.93 Those who support allowing lawyers to have equity ownership
in clients argue that equity ownership allows start-up companies with very
little capital to hire attorneys because law firms are inclined to offer more
flexible billing arrangements. 94 Clients benefit because lawyers are willing
to offer legal and business advice. 95 Further, equity ownership in clients
also potentially increases client loyalty to the firm.96 Attorneys are
encouraged to evaluate all equity investments in clients under Model Rule
1.8(a) to ensure the attorney fees are not excessive. 97
Though it does not prohibit equity ownership, the commentary to
Model Rule 1.7 generally advises it may be "difficult or impossible" for an
91. MODEL RULE OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7 (2004). Specifically, Model Rule 1.7
provides:
(a) Except as provided in paragraph (b), a lawyer shall not represent a client if
the representation involves a concurrent conflict of interest. A concurrent
conflict of interest exists if:
(2) there is a significant risk that the representation of one or more clients
will be materially limited.. .by a personal interest of the lawyer.
(b) Notwithstanding the existence of a concurrent conflict of interest under
paragraph (a), a lawyer may represent a client if:
(1) the lawyer reasonably believes that the lawyer will be able to provide
competent and diligent representation to each affected client;
(2) the representation is not prohibited by law;
(3) the representation does not involve the assertion of a claim by one
client against another client represented by the lawyer in the same
litigation or other proceeding before a tribunal; and
(4) each affected client gives informed consent, confirmed in writing.
92. Id.
93. See e.g., Jason M. Klein, No Fool For a Client: The Finance and Incentives Behind
Stock-Based Compensation for Corporate Attorneys, 1999 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 329, 334-35
(1999).
94. Id. at 340; John S. Dzienkowski & Robert J. Peroni, The Decline in Lawyer
Independence: Lawyer Equity Investments in Clients, 81 TEX. L. REV. 405, 416-19 (2002).
95. Dzienkowski and Peroni, supra note 94, at 430, 433.
96. Id. at 432.
97. Klein, supra note 93, at 332.
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attorney to give independent advice to a client when the lawyer has a
personal interest in a transaction. 98 The commentary to Model Rule 1.7
recommends steps the lawyer should take to protect the client.99 External
corporate attorneys should assess whether a transaction is fair and rea-
sonable by ensuring that: (1) the client was not coerced into the transaction;
(2) the lawyer gave independent advice to the client; and, (3) the client
would have received the same advice from an independent or disinterested
lawyer.100
The ABA recommends that law firms establish investment policies to
minimize the risks of equity investments in clients. 101 Included in such
investment policies are procedures to ensure any equity investments in
clients are fair, reasonable, and consistent with the requirements under
Model Rules 1.7 and 1.8(a) on excessive fees, and that investments in
clients are limited. 102 A review of state ethics opinions indicates the
majority of state ethic opinions follow the rationale of the ABA and permit
external counsel to make or have equity investments in clients provided:
that the attorneys take measures to ensure fairness of the transaction to the
client, that the client has made informed consent, and that the fee is not
excessive.103 The ABA recommends that when equity investment in clients
increases the financial dependence of the law firm on a single client,
external counsel should withdraw from representation even if the client
consents. 104
The Council of the Section of Litigation, in its Report on the
Independent Lawyer (Report on Lawyer Independence), 105 writes "in-house
counsel's receipt or ownership of equity-based compensation is not
problematic as long as the lawyer reasonably believes that the repre-
sentation of the client will not be materially limited by the lawyer's own
interest." 106 The Report on Lawyer Independence did not recommend
against external counsel investments in clients, but encouraged lawyers to
98. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7(a)(2), R. 1.7 cmt (2004).
99. Id.
100. MODEL RULE OF PROF'L CONDUCT 1.7(a)(2); ABA Formal Op. 00-418, 3-4 (2000),
available at http://www.cobar.org/static/comms/ethics/fo/00-418.html.
101. ABA Formal Op., supra note 100, at 2-3.
102. Id.; Margaret Colgate Love, The Revised ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct:
Summary ofthe Work of Ethics 2000, 15 GEO. 1. LEGAL ETHICS 441, 448-49 (2002).
103. See ABA Formal Op., supra note 100, at 6.
104. Id. at 7.
105. ABA TASK FORCE ON THE INDEPENDENT LAWYER, LAWYERS DOING BUSINESS WITH
THEIR CLIENTS: IDENTIFYING AND AVOIDING LEGAL AND ETHICAL DANGERS 56 (2001)
[hereinafter Independent Lawyer Report], available at http://abanet.org/litigation/abareport.pdf.
106. Id. at 56; see also ABA Formal Op., supra note 100, at 6.
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be vigilant in searching for potential conflicts of interests and to take steps
to avoid any harm to clients. 107
C. How DOES MODEL RULE 1.7 APPLY TO THE GENERAL COUNSEL?
Professional rules interpreting attorney conflicts of interest are
premised on protecting the client from undue influence of the attorney. 108
The Model Rule 1.7 Commentary recommends that a lawyer withdraw from
representing a client if the lawyer's financial interest in the client leads to
the reasonable conclusion that the representation would be adversely
affected.109 Current commentary and ABA guidance on Model Rule 1.7
provide no specific guidelines recommending review of stock option or
other equity grants to the general counsel.110 Moreover, the Model Rules
focus on protecting the client from undue influence by the attorney and
provide limited direction for the general counsel on how to assess
independence."'
Stock option ownership in clients by the general counsel raises
conflicts of interest issues under Model Rule 1.7(b) (Lawyer
Independence).112 The ABA Formal Opinion on acquiring ownership in
clients and the Report on Lawyer Independence both concluded that in-
house counsel receipt of equity based compensation such as stock options is
not prohibited under Model Rule 1.7(b), provided that the lawyer rea-
sonably believes that the representation will not be materially limited by the
lawyer's interests.11 3 The Report on Lawyer Independence acknowledged
that in-house counsel stock option compensation is not normally the type of
transaction contemplated by the Model Rules.'14 The Report then concluded
that in-house counsel's receipt of stock options is not a problem provided
that the in-house lawyer reasonably believes his or her own interest will not
materially impact the client.115 Determining that most in-house counsel
equity compensation is a "small facet of his or her general counsel employ-
ment" and that most equity compensation are "small incremental [grants]
107. Independent Lawyer Report, supra note 105, at 56-58
108. Id. at 43.
109. Id. at 56; MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCr R. 1.7 cmts. 4, 10 (2004).
110. Independent Lawyer Report, supra note 105, at 55-56.
111. Id. at 56.
112. Id. at 56-57.
113. Independent Lawyer Report, supra note 105, at 56; ABA Formal Opinion, supra note
100, at 5.
114. Independent Lawyer Report, supra note 105, at 58.
115. Id. at 56.
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over time" the Report concluded that conflict issues under Rule 1.7 are not
normally raised for in-house counsel. 16
The Report on Lawyer Independence further concluded that equity
compensation did not raise issues under Rule 1.8 (Excessive Fees), as
equity compensation is part of usual compensation paid to in-house counsel
as part of his or her regular employment relationship."t 7 The Report also
determined that aligning in-house counsel interest with those of
shareholders generally did not create adverse interests to clients, and that
violation of securities laws by improper trading of corporate stock risks
criminal liability by the in-house attorney.118 However, recommending that
each situation be examined on "its unique facts," the Report on Lawyer
Independence suggested that a large personal equity interest might raise
questions on the in-house lawyer's ability to represent a client if the legal
advice might result in a significant financial loss of the lawyer's equity
interest.119 Generally, stock options granted to the general counsel are
awarded as part of a corporation's long-term incentive plan.120 However,
when the general counsel is involved in drafting the documents and specific
terms of the plan, issues of fairness to the company are raised.121
The Cheek Task Force's Preliminary Report recommended further
review of executive compensation and potential conflicts of interest issues,
writing that:
the Task Force has.. .not at this time formulated recommendations
on specific policy initiatives relating directly to public company
audits, executive compensation and benefit plans, security analysts
or employee retirement benefit plans. It is nevertheless the sense
of the Task Force that meaningful reforms in these areas are
necessary to complement the reforms it is proposing with respect
to board of directors and corporate lawyers.... [T]he Task Force
also believes that executive compensation practices, including the
provisions and accounting for stock options, need to be carefully
considered in reviewing reform necessary to enhancing corporate
responsibility.122
116. Id. at 57-58.
117. Id. at 58.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 57-58.
120. Independent Lawyer Report, supra note 105, at 58.
121. Id. at 57. See also Liggio, supra note 21, at 1208-09, 1214-16, 1218 (discussing areas
of corporate affairs in which in-house counsel is involved and its affect on the company).
122. Preliminary Report, supra note 70, at 194 n. 9.
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Notwithstanding professional rules permitting lawyer equity ownership
in clients, courts generally view such transactions under fiduciary
principles, and presume such transactions are fraudulent, shifting respon-
sibility to the attorney to demonstrate the fairness of a transaction to the
client. 23 Courts look to the appearance of impropriety to assess attorney
independent judgment. 124
D. WHAT Do COURTS AND REGULATORY AGENCIES HAVE TO SAY
ON INDEPENDENT JUDGMENT?
A few courts have addressed the issue of lawyer independence and
have recognized that loyalty to a superior can influence the independent
judgment of in-house counsel. Though not addressing issues of equity
ownership, the court in In re Oracle Systems Securities Litigation,125 a
derivative settlement action, questioned whether representation of indi-
vidual defendants and the corporation by its general counsel raises conflict
issues because of the subservient loyalty of in-house counsel to the officers
of the corporation.126 The court stressed the importance of avoiding the
appearance of impropriety when in-house counsel must advocate positions
in support of their superiors. 127
In Simms v. Exeter Architectural Products, Inc.,128 the court considered
whether an attorney's equity ownership in a closely held corporation
created a conflict of interest that precluded the attorney from representing
the corporation.129 The former president of Exeter asked to disqualify
Exeter's law firm because the firm advised him personally on the matter
involved in the litigation, thus creating a conflict of interest.1 30 Several of
the law firm partners owned equity interest in Exeter.131 The court did not
directly address the attorney client relationship, but specifically considered
123. See Nancy J. Moore, Conflicts of Interest for In-House Counsel: Issues Emerging from
the Expanding Role of the Attorney-Employee, 39 S. TEX. L. REv. 497, 546 (1998) (mentioning
that "conflicts of interest are beginning to surface in the public eye, most disturbingly, in the form
of legal malpractice and breach of fiduciary duty lawsuits against the lawyers themselves as well
as their corporate clients").
124. ABA Formal Op., supra note 100, at 6.
125. 829 F. Supp. 1176 (N.D. Cal. 1993).
126. In re Oracle, 829 F. Supp. at 1187-88. See also Yablonski v. United Mine Workers of
Am., 448 F.2d 1175, 1177-78 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (discussing the representation of a union president
by the union's general counsel in a civil action for misappropriation of funds).
127. Id.
128. 868 F. Supp. 668 (M.D. Pa. 1994).
129. Simms, 868 F. Supp. at 675.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 676.
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the equity positions held by several partners in Exeter.1 32 The court found
that when the attorney is both an advocate for and an owner of an entity, "it
appears to be extremely difficult if not impossible for the attorney to give
advice as a non-interested party." 133 Concerned about the appearance of
impropriety, the court concluded a firm serving as corporate counsel that is
also a shareholder should be disqualified from representing Exeter under
Rule 1.7(b).134
However, determining that stock ownership in the client public
corporation did not disqualify the attorney under Model Rule 1.7(b), the
court in Syscon v. United States135 stated that suggestions that the lawyers'
"concern for the corporate pocketbook" puts independent judgment at risk
were unreasonable. 136 The general counsel of Syscon owned stock in the
corporation, served on the board of directors, and was also a partner in the
law firm representing Syscon in litigation.137 The government asserted that
the independence of the legal advice in the litigation was compromised
because of the dual status of the general counsel.138 The court held that an
attorney's stock ownership in the client corporation did not disqualify the
firm from representing the client in litigation. 139 Concerned about the
policy implications of disqualifying a general counsel who owned stock in
his client from representing the client in litigation matters, the court rea-
soned that if courts were to assume that if stock ownership compromised
the judgment of the general counsel, then it would preclude the general
counsel from serving as litigation counsel.140
Courts are concerned with the appearance of impropriety under Rule
1.7 as it relates to in-house counsel representation of corporate clients.141
Where equity ownership in a client raises issues of attorney independence,
courts will consider the practical and policy implications of precluding in-
house attorneys from representing corporate clients due to conflicts of
132. Id. at 676.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 677.
135. 10 CI. Ct. 200 (1986).
136. Syscon, 10 Cl. Ct. at 202.
137. Id. at 201.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 204.
140. Id.
141. See e.g., id. at 201-02 (discussing the government's argument on Model Rule 1.7 in the
Syscon case).
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interests.142 Courts also examine attorney transactions with clients to
ensure that the lawyer has not breached a fiduciary duty.143
The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has provided no
administrative ruling on what external and in-house counsel must do to en-
sure independent legal advice. There are no SEC administrative rulings on
attorney conflict of interest, and the SEC has not addressed the issue of
lawyer independence or management influence on attorney independent
judgment. However, the SEC has consistently advised attorneys to report
client wrongdoing to a higher authority within the corporation and to
conduct internal investigations, including following up to ensure
compliance. 144
In In re Carter, 145 external corporate attorneys were not sanctioned by
the SEC when the attorneys were accused of aiding and abetting a client in
repeatedly failing to make required disclosures under securities laws. 146
Although the attorneys were originally sanctioned by an administrative law
judge, on appeal, the full Commission held that without clear prior guidance
from the SEC on what is "unethical and improper professional conduct," a
lawyer should not be disciplined by the SEC.147 The SEC further stated that
"when a lawyer...becomes aware that his client is engaged in a substantial
and continuing failure to satisfy.. .disclosure requirements, his continued
participation violates professional standards unless he takes prompt steps to
end the client's noncompliance.... "148 The Commission recommended that
the attorneys consider resigning or reporting the matter to others in the
corporation, including the directors, but did not outline specific actions. 149
In In re Gutfruend,150 the SEC concluded that the CLO of Salomon
Brothers failed to take appropriate measures to prevent his client from
violating the law. 15 1 The SEC also concluded the CLO, after learning of
possible criminal conduct, did not do enough to investigate and also
suggested that the CLO was obligated to ensure that appropriate steps are
142. Syscon, 10 Cl. Ct. at 201-02.
143. See Dzienkowski, supra note 94, at 445-48.
144. See In re Carter, S.E.C. Release No. 34-17597 [1981 Transfer Binder], Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH), 5 82,847, at 84,146 (Feb. 28, 1981) (providing an example of the SEC providing this
type of advice).
145. S.E.C. Release No. 34-17597 [1981 Transfer Binder], Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH), J
82,847 (Feb. 28, 1981).
146. In re Carter, [1981 Transfer Binder], Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) at 84, 146.
147. id. at 84,172.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. S.E.C. Release No. 34-31554 [1992 Transfer Binder], Fed. Sec. L. Rep (CCH) T 85,067,
at 83,597 (Dec. 3, 1992).
151. In re Gutfreund, [1992 Transfer Binder], Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH), at 83,609.
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taken to rectify known violations of law.152 The SEC further advised that
the CLO should monitor an internal investigation of misconduct to ensure
its recommendations are carried out, approach other senior management if
management failed to act, and if that failed, approach the board of directors,
resign, or disclose misconduct to the SEC. 153
It is unknown how far the SEC will go to enforce the gatekeeper
responsibilities of the general counsel, but it is certain the SEC will look to
the general counsel to maintain the integrity of public company disclosures
and to serve as the arbiter of independent advice.154 While the SEC has not
addressed the issue of independent judgment by attorneys, armed with a
Congressional mandate to regulate the professional ethics obligations of
attorneys advising public companies, we are likely to see more enforcement
actions against attorneys who fail to reign in clients engaged in misconduct.
E. THE SEC'S RESPONSE TO ATTORNEY MISCONDUCT AND
CORPORATE MALFEASANCE: SARBANES-OXLEY § 307 AND SEC
IMPLEMENTING REGULATION 17 C.F.R. § 205
Before enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, the SEC maintained it
was not in the business of regulating attorney ethics.15 5 In July 2002,
stressing the need to restore investor confidence after several corporate
scandals shook public markets, Congress passed and the president signed
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act into law.156 The purpose of the act was to restore
confidence in public companies through regulation of executives and their
advisers, including accountants and lawyers.157 Section 307 was added to
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. See e.g., Beck, supra note 11, at 906-07 (discussing the tradition of the legal profession
as self-regulating and mentioning the possible shift in that tradition after Sarbanes Oxley);
Geraldine Scott Moohr, An Enron Lesson: The Modest Role of Criminal Law in Preventing
Corporate Crime, 55 FLA. L. REV. 937, 973 (2003) (mentioning the role of lawyers in being
required to act as a "gatekeeper" by reporting securities violations after Sarbanes Oxley); William
H. Donaldson, Chairman, U.S. Sec. and Exch. Comm., Remarks to the Practising Law Institute,
Washington, D.C. (March 5, 2004), available a t http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/
spch030504whd.htm (discussing the need for an independent board of directors, in general).
155. See e.g., Letter from David M. Becker, General Counsel, Securities and Exchange
Commission, to Richard W. Painter, Professor of Law, University of Illinois (March 28, 2002) (on
file with North Carolina Banking Institute).
156. Final Rule: Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, SEC
Release Nos. 33-8185, 34-47276, IC-25919, File No. S7-45-02 (Aug. 5, 2003) [hereinafter Final
Rule], available at http://sec.gov/rules/final/33-8185.htm.
157. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 7211 (a) (2004) (stating that, for example, the purpose of establishing
the accounting oversight board under Sarbanes-Oxley was to "protect the interests of investors and
further the public interest in the preparation of informative, accurate and independent audit
reports"); 15 U.S.C.A. § 7245 (2004) (stating that minimum standards of conduct for attorneys
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Sarbanes-Oxley creating a congressional mandate for the SEC to establish
rules for attorney professional conduct.158 Although the ABA lobbied
Congress and the SEC insisted that regulation of attorney ethics should be
left to state bar rules and state courts, the SEC issued final rules effective in
August 2003 governing attorney ethical obligations in reporting client
misconduct.159 The regulations do not specifically mandate that attorneys
take certain measures to maintain independent legal advice. However, con-
sistent with state and ABA model rules, the requirements of "up-the-
ladder" reporting presume that attorneys will meet professional standards of
independence in carrying out obligations to investigate and report material
violations of law as mandated by section 307 of Sarbanes-Oxley. 160
The rules adopted by the SEC detail reporting requirements. First, an
attorney must report evidence of a material violation, determined according
to an objective standard, "up-the-ladder" to the chief legal counsel or the
chief executive officer of the company or the equivalent.161 Second, if the
chief legal counsel or the chief executive officer of the company does not
respond appropriately to the evidence, the attorney is required to report the
evidence to the audit committee, another committee of independent
directors, or the full board of directors.162 Third, attorneys that provide
legal services to an issuer who have an attorney-client relationship with the
issuer, and who have notice that documents they are preparing or assisting
in preparing will be filed with or submitted to the SEC are covered by the
Rules.163 Fourth, an attorney may satisfy the reporting obligation by
reporting evidence of a material violation to a "qualified legal compliance
committee (QLCC)," as an alternative procedure for reporting evidence of a
material violation.164 Such a QLCC would consist of at least one member
of the issuer's audit committee or an equivalent committee of independent
directors, and two or more independent board members, and would have the
responsibility, among other things, to recommend that an issuer implement
an appropriate response to evidence of a material violation.165 Fifth, an
attorney may reveal confidential information related to his or her
representation without the consent of an issuer client to the extent the
practicing before the S.E.C. shall be established "in the public interest and for the protection of
investors").
158. Final Rule, supra note 156; 17 C.F.R § 205.1 (2004).
159. Final Rule, supra note 156.
160. 17 C.F.R. § 205.1.
161. 17 C.F.R. § 205.3 (b)(1) (2004).
162. Id. § 205.3 (b)(3)(i)-(iii).
163. Id. § 205.3 (b)(4)-(10).
164. Id. § 205.3 (b)(6)(i)(B).
165. Id. § 205.3 (c)(1)-(2).
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attorney reasonably believes necessary (1) to prevent the issuer from
committing a material violation likely to cause substantial financial injury
to the financial interests or property of the issuer or investors; (2) to prevent
the issuer from committing an illegal act; or, (3) to rectify the consequences
of a material violation or illegal act in which the attorney's services have
been used. 166
Sixth, the Rules modify the definition of the term "evidence of a ma-
terial violation," which defines the trigger for an attorney's obligation to
report "up-the-ladder" within an issuer. 167 The revised definition confirms
that the SEC intends an objective rather than a subjective triggering stan-
dard, involving credible evidence based upon which it would be
unreasonable, under the circumstances, for a prudent and competent
attorney not to conclude that it is reasonably likely that a material violation
has occurred, is ongoing, or is about to occur. 168 Finally, the Rules state
that in the event the Rules conflict with state law, the Rules will govern, but
will not preempt the ability of a state to impose more rigorous obligations
on attorneys that are not inconsistent with the Rules. 169 The Rules also
affirmatively state that no private cause of action is created and that
authority to enforce compliance with the Rules is vested exclusively with
the SEC. 170
The SEC regulations do not replace state or other jurisdictional
professional rules that are more restrictive, provided such rules do not
conflict with SEC requirements. 171 The regulations are designed to increase
investor confidence in public companies by "ensuring that attorneys who
represent issuers report up the corporate ladder evidence of material vio-
lations by their officers and employees." 172
The congressional mandate to regulate the professional conduct of
attorneys practicing before the SEC encompasses in-house and external
counsel who do not specifically practice in the securities law area, and
places the responsibility for reporting material violations of law "up the
ladder" within the corporation firmly in the hands of in-house counsel-the
general counsel is gatekeeper for the public trust. 173 Compliance with
Sarbanes-Oxley regulations presumes the CLO is acting in the best interests
166. Id. § 205.3 (d).
167. 17 C.F.R. § 205.2 (b) (2004).
168. Id. § 205.2 (b)(1)-(3).
169. 17 C.F.R. § 205.4 (2004).
170. 17 C.F.R. § 205.7 (2004).
171. 17C.F.R. § 205.1.
172. Final Rule, supra note 156.
173. Coffee, supra note 18, at 1295-96, 1301
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of the company.174 In instances where it is believed the CLO has not taken
appropriate action to stop or prevent corporate fraud or other material
violations of law, other in-house attorneys are now required to receive the
results of investigations and continue to report the matter "up the ladder"
within the corporation.175 If it is reasonably believed allegations of material
violations of law have not been investigated, then the attorney must report
allegations directly to the board of directors. 176 Such rules are designed to
allow in-house attorneys to report evidence of material violations of law
directly to the board in the event the reporting attorney believes the CLO is
unwilling to conduct a thorough investigation. 177
F. GATEKEEPER: THE IMPACT OF SARBANES-OXLEY
Enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act further obligates the chief legal
officer or general counsel of a public company to take certain mandatory
measures to prevent corporate malfeasance. 178 Passage of Sarbanes-Oxley
and the related SEC implementing regulations make clear that the general
counsel is required to serve as the legal gatekeeper for public companies.I7 9
Independence is paramount to the general counsel in successfully serving
the gatekeeper function. 180 The integrity of public disclosures are depen-
dent on the perception that the general counsel's loyalty to superiors will
not influence his or her independent advice to executive management or the
board of directors. 181 The general counsel should discuss with independent
board members not only possible corporate management illegal conduct,
but any concerns of undue influence over in-house counsel. 182
The mandates of "up the ladder" reporting potential fraudulent conduct
by corporate agents requires corporate attorney and practicing in-house and
external counsel to be diligent to ensure the best interest of the corporation
is served in business transactions. 183 Sarbanes-Oxley regulations require
members of the general counsel's staff to continue to report allegations of
174. Id. at 1311-12.
175. 17 C.F.R. § 205.3(b)(3).
176. Id.
177. Id. at § 205.3 (b)(4).
178. Coffee, supra note 18, at 1302-07.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 1311.
181. See id. (explaining that when a law firm holds a substantial portion of the corporate
client's equity, they will be biased and a poor monitor).
182. Final Report, supra note 20, at 23-24; Preliminary Report, supra note 70, at 205.
183. Preliminary Report, supra note 70, at 201-05.
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corporate misconduct "up the ladder" if the attorney believes the general
counsel has not taken appropriate action. 184
The general counsel is the transactional attorney and corporate gate-
keeper. Compensating general counsels with base salaries and bonuses for
managing the legal affairs of the company is appropriate. Rewarding the
general counsel for "thinking like an owner" is not. The chief legal officer
represents the best interests of the corporation and there should be no
appearance of impropriety regarding independent advice.
Compliance with Sarbanes-Oxley requirements increases the legal and
professional responsibilities of the general counsel to serve the best inter-
ests of the corporation and to see that financial goals are attained
lawfully.185 The general counsel should be rewarded for outstanding legal
work, including compliance with ethical obligations of the SEC and the
state bar. Salary and bonuses in recognition of outstanding performance are
appropriate. Stock options are rewards for reaching financial performance
goals. Millions of dollars in stock option wealth not only raises questions
about where the general loyalties lie, but can compromise the general
counsel's judgment in the same way other corporate executives are com-
promised by the lure of stock option wealth. 186
IV. GUIDANCE FOR THE GENERAL COUNSEL
A. TAKEN ALTOGETHER, WHAT IS REQUIRED FOR INDEPENDENT
JUDGMENT?
The general counsel is to act in the best interests of the corporation, not
in the best interests of the general counsel's superiors or his or her personal
interests. The Model Rules require the general counsel to assess potential
client conflicts of interest between himself or herself and the corporation,
and ensure that any of the general counsel's adverse interests do not harm
the client. 187 The general counsel must make certain the corporate client
understands the nature of the conflict, receives independent advice con-
cerning waiving the conflict, and if a stock option grant represents a
significant personal asset of the general counsel, he or she must determine if
184. 17 C.F.R. § 205.3 (b)(3).
185. Preliminary Report, supra note 20, at 193-99; Findings and Recommendations, supra
note 69, at 7.
186. See generally Keith R. Fisher, The Higher Calling: Regulation of Post-Enron Lawyers,
37 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 1017, 1018 (Summer 2004) (discussing "post-Enron" ethical
obligations of attorneys and asserting that lawyers and their representative bar association's
promulgation may be "motivated by politics and self-interest").
187. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7 (b) (2004).
2005]
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
the compensation is excessive and withdraw from representation notwith-
standing the conflict waiver. 188 The general counsel must review any
equity compensation through the lens of impropriety and fairness to the
corporate entity. The general counsel must report allegations of material
violations of law by corporate agents "up the ladder" and the general
counsel's failure to investigate a report of material violations risks further
"up the ladder" reports of non-action. 189 Finally, the general counsel is to
resign when faced with recalcitrant clients and if necessary, report the
reason for the withdrawal to the board of directors or outside regulatory
authorities. 190 Is this practical advice for the general counsel?
B. WHAT'S WRONG WITH STOCK OPTIONS?
Believing stock options should be eliminated from executive compen-
sation, Paul Volcker 91 states that stock options "are subject to abuse and
temptation in a way that's almost irrefutable."1 92 It is believed that stock
options lead executives to focus on short-term financial results that
positively affect personal financial wealth and lead executives to manip-
ulate or produce fraudulent financial statements. 193 Executives faced with
the loss of millions of dollars in personal assets will choose to protect their
personal wealth rather than do what is best for the corporate entity. 194
Similarly, when stock options comprise the general counsel's largest
personal financial asset and the ability to continue to receive stock options
hinges on conforming to the demands of the chief executive officer, it is not
unreasonable to assume that the independent judgment of the general
counsel might be adversely affected.195
188. See id.; MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7, cmts. 3-4, 17-18.
189. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7, cmt. 35.
190. Id.
191. See The Trilateral Commission: Paul A. Volcker, http://www.trilateral.org/
membship/bios/pv.htm (last visited Mar. 7, 2005) (providing the biographical information for Paul
Volcker). Paul A. Volcker is former North American Chairman of The Trilateral Commission. He
is former Chairman of Wolfensohn & Co., Inc., as well as Professor Emeritus of International
Economic Policy at Princeton University. Mr. Volcker served as Chairman of the Board of
Governors of the U.S. Federal Reserve System, Commission on Public Trust and Private
Enterprise. Id.
192. Cassidy, supra note 8, at 15 (quoting Paul A. Volccker).
193. Id. at 6-13; Wallace, supra note 11, at 586-87.
194. Cassidy, supra note 8, at 6-13; Wallace, supra note 11, at 586-87; Final Report, supra
note 20, at 11.
195. Christine Hurt, Counselor, Gatekeeper, Shareholder, Thief: Why Attorneys Who Invest
in Their Clients in a Post-Enron World Are "Selling Out," Not "Buying In", 64 OHIO ST. L.J.
897, 898-901 (2003).
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C. WHY ARE STOCK OPTIONS FOR THE GENERAL COUNSEL A
PROBLEM?
Because the chief executive and his or her senior management team all
were getting rich from stock options or other equity compensation, many
companies tolerated corporate cultures of avarice'96 and few executives
were willing to raise questions about questionable financial statements. 197
The Cheek Task Force ("CTF") cited the increases in stock price, man-
agement desires to meet Wall Street expectations, and competitive pressures
on executive compensation as factors contributing to corporate environ-
ments where independent advice can be difficult to render. 198 CTF
concluded that
[a]ided by dramatic stock price growth, equity-based executive
compensation-particularly in the form of stock options-as a
means intended to align the interests of managers and shareholders
became increasingly prevalent and lucrative. There were unanti-
cipated consequences. Executive officers were endowed with
powerful personal incentives to meet near term Wall Street earn-
ings expectations and to avoid any negative impact upon current
stock market prices. Directors faced significant pressures to pro-
duce executive compensation and benefit packages that were
attractive in an ever-escalating executive compensation market-
place. The reasonableness of compensation and its structure, as
well as the motivations being created, may not have received
sufficient independent consideration. 199
What makes the application of the professional rules of conduct for the
general counsel different from those applicable to counsel in private
practice or outside counsel? The answer is twofold: the chief executive
officer is the direct superior of the general counsel responsible for perfor-
mance reviews and compensation decisions, and the management pressure
on the general counsel to fit into the corporate culture and advance within
the corporate ranks. 200
At the Randolph W. Thrower Symposium, Sally Weaver remarked:
196. Cassidy, supra note 8, at 7-8.
197. Id. at 15.
198. Preliminary Report, supra note 70, at 192.
199. Id. at 193.
200. Final Report, supra note 20, at 14-15; Raphael Grunfeld, Getting Caught in the Middle:
Enron Experience Shows How In-House Lawyers Can Be an Unprotected Species, N.Y. L. J.
(May 6, 2002), available at http://www.clm.com/pubs/pub- 11676731. html.
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Corporate counsel[s]... are generally reluctant to acknowledge, at
least publicly, any distinction between themselves and lawyers in
private practice. Corporate counsel[s] have recently realized a
significant increase in number and growth in prestige. They
clearly remember, however, a time in the not so-distant past when
many of their colleagues in private practice relegated them to the
status of second-class citizens. They also fear that the develop-
ment of different ethical rules, for or the different application of
existing ethical rules to, corporate counsel could relegate them
again to that second-class status. Corporate counsels have joined
in a public incantation of sameness.... Corporate counsel[s] ac-
tually do practice law in an environment that differs dramatically
from that of their colleagues in private practice. That difference
means that the existing rules of professional conduct, at least as
historically interpreted, may provide inadequate guidance to
corporate counsel.201
The Model Rules' recommendation that in-house counsels resign or
withdraw from representation when faced with recalcitrant clients is not
helpful to corporate clients. The Model Rules ignore the financial depen-
dence of the general counsel on a single client, the pressure on the general
counsel to fit into the corporate culture, and the demands of chief executive
officers on general counsels to "find a way."2 02
D. THE ROLE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL, INDEPENDENCE AND
WITHDRAWAL FROM REPRESENTATION
The general counsel's job as transactional attorney and gatekeeper
demands that the general counsel is independent enough to tell senior
management, the chief executive officer, or the board of directors what they
may not want to hear.203 If management insists on causing "substantial
financial harm" to the corporation or committing "material violations of
law" contrary to the legal advice of the general counsel, lawyers must take
action to protect the interests of the corporation.2 04
201. Weaver, supra note 21, at 1031.
202. Id. at 1027.
203. Id. at 1040-51; see also Balla v. Gabmro, Inc., 584 N.E.2d 104 (111. 1991) (describing a
suit brought by in-house counsel for retaliatory discharge after the attorney told his employer that
he would do whatever was necessary to stop employer's sale of defective product).
204. Weaver, supra note 21, at 1040-52; Veasey, supra note 12, at 12-14.
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Financial dependence on a single client and the significant financial
wealth provided by stock options can compromise independent judgment. 205
Granting stock option incentive compensation to the general counsel to
align his or her financial goals with those of executive management ignores
the duty of the general counsel to represent the corporate entity, not its
agents. Once the financial interests of the general counsel are aligned with
executive management, his or her ability to rein in corporate misconduct is
impaired. 20
6
Current professional rules suggest that the general counsel, like his
external brethren, should withdraw when management insists on breaching
fiduciary duties or engaging in fraudulent financial transactions, and when
the general counsel reasonably believes his or her independent judgment is
impaired. Resigning is not always a viable option for general counsels. 07
While the financial costs to external counsels are significant, external
counsels have other clients within the firm in the event withdrawal is
required. 208 The career costs to a resigning general counsel can be finan-
cially devastating and future career prospects can be difficult.209 General
counsels can and should embrace attorney professional conduct rules and
corporate governance practices designed to ensure corporate counsel
independence from management. While resigning will distance the general
counsel from the acts of the intransigent client, resignation does not restore
the harm to the corporation whose general counsel independent judgment is
compromised. 210
A general counsel's option grants no longer appear to be a small part of
overall compensation, and the magnitude of equity wealth for general coun-
sels raises conflict issues under Model Rules 1.7 and 1.8(a). 211 On what
basis is the general counsel to assess whether his or her stock option
compensation is excessive under Model Rule 1.8(a)? There is very little
205. See Thomas D. Morgan, Toward a New Perspective on Legal Ethics, Remarks at the
Keck Lecture on Ethics and Professional Responsibility (Feb. 13, 200), (on file with author)
available at http://www.abf-sociolegal.org/keck lecture.html (last visited Oct. 7. 2003) While
salary and bonus compensation for the general counsel can be high, stock options present a unique
circumstance due to the potential for large gain and the ability of executives to manipulate
corporate financial results to keep the stock price high in order for corporate executives to reap a
gain. Id.
206. See Daly, supra note 13, at 1099-1100 (explaining that a lawyer who is dependent on a
single client for his or her livelihood cannot provide independent advice of the same caliber as
outside counsel).
207. Moore, supra note 123, at 521-23.
208. Kim, supra note 14, at 204.
209. Wallace, supra note 11, at 611-12.
210. Kim, supra note 14, at 204-07.
211. Independent Lawyer Report, supra note 105, at 58; Lee, supra note 58.
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guidance to answer this question because the Model Rules focus on
protecting the client.212
Expressing concern over the ability of general counsels to render
independent advice, the Cheek Task Force wrote that the general counsel
may succumb to the pressure to "advance with the corporate executive
structure... [and may] to seek to please the corporate officials with whom
they deal rather than to focus on the long-term interest of the client...." 213
Addressing these concerns, the Cheek Task Force recommended and the
ABA endorsed corporate governance practices guidelines. 214  The
Corporate Governance Resolution identified twelve steps for corporate
boards and their attorneys. 215 The guidelines related to attorney conduct
state that:
4. Providing information and analysis necessary for the directors to
discharge their oversight responsibilities, particularly as they relate
to legal compliance matters, requires the active involvement of
general counsel for the public corporation.
5. A lawyer representing a public corporation shall serve the
interests of the entity, independent of the personal interests of any
particular director, officer, employee or shareholder.
6. The general counsel of a public corporation should have primary
responsibility for assuring the implementation of an effective legal
compliance system under the oversight of the board of directors.
7. Public corporations should adopt practices in which:
a. The selection, retention, and compensation of the corpora-
tion's general counsel are approved by the board of directors.
b. General counsel meets regularly and in executive session
with a committee of independent directors to communicate
concerns regarding legal compliance matters, including poten-
tial or ongoing material violations of law by, and breaches of
fiduciary duty to, the corporation.
212. Independent Lawyer Report, supra note 105, at 15-40.
213. Final Report, supra note 20, at 15.
214. Id. at 24-25.
215. Id. at 31-33. Tying general counsel compensation to earnings per share or other
financial incentives, converges executive officers personal goals with the general counsel's goals
of protecting the legal interest of the corporate entity. Unlike salary and bonuses, manipulation of
financial disclosures can influence the price at which stock options are exercised and sold.
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c. All reporting relationships of internal and outside lawyers
for a public corporation establish at the outset a direct line of
communication with general counsel through which these
lawyers are to inform the general counsel of material potential
or ongoing violations of law by, and breaches of fiduciary
duty to, the corporation. 216
The ABA Corporate Governance guidelines underscore the important
role of the general counsel in maintaining good corporate governance and
ensuring independent advice to corporate management and boards. The
Corporate Governance guidelines are a step forward in advising the general
counsel on how to maintain independent legal advice. The Corporate
Governance Resolution encourages regular meetings between the general
counsel and independent directors to assure critical matters and fiduciary
duty violations are reviewed by higher authorities.217
V. CONCLUSION: WHAT IS NEEDED FOR THE GENERAL
COUNSEL?
General counsels need professional guidance responsive to the realties
of corporate in-house practice.218 Further review of Model Rules 1.7 and
1.8 is needed to assess the appropriate way to compensate general counsels
and maintain independent legal advice to corporate clients.
In addition to embracing the ABA Corporate Governance Resolution,
this article recommends that corporate boards consider the following
governance measures: (1) set the general counsel compensation, including
bonus; (2) reward and compensate the general counsel for managing the
legal affairs of the company and not for reaching financial performance
goals; and, (3) eliminate stock options from the total general counsel
compensation.
By taking away evaluation and compensation authority from the chief
executive officer, the general counsel is less inclined to worry about
whether unpopular legal advice will result in reduced compensation. 219
Good corporate governance requires corporate gatekeepers' integrity to
withstand the scrutiny of watchful regulators and corporate market
constituencies. 220 The legal profession should not wait until faced with the
216. Id. at 31-32.
217. Id. at 20-23.
218. Moore, supra note 123, at 545-47; Weaver, supra note 21 at 1050-51.
219. See Findings and Recommendations, supra note 69, at 10 (recommending that
compensation committees take a more active role in evaluating executive compensation).
220. See Morgan, supra note 205, at 3 (explaining that the legal profession needs to
continually adapt their ethics rules according to the changing dynamics of the world); Donaldson,
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debacle suffered by the accounting industry. In light of recent general
counsel conduct, continued discussion on additional ways to ensure that
professional rules provide guidance to general counsels is needed.221
Sarbanes-Oxley was enacted because Congress believed lawyers needed
federal professional ethical standards. Why? Because it seems the current
state bars and ABA professional rules were not enough to prevent general
counsels from being indicted along with their clients.
supra note 154 (explaining the SEC's policies as they concern four major SEC divisions:
Enforcement, Investment Management, Market Regulation, and Corporation Finance).
221. Russell, supra note 16, at 545.
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